By Jim Spiri
Freelance War Correspondent
Mosul, Iraq - Today, the first day of Ramadan, the holy month for Muslims in Iraq, Lt. General Odierno, a key figure in the day to day operations with all US Army forces in
Iraq, came to Mosul.
Odierno, arrived by helicopter and was greeted by Brigade Commander, Col. Steven Twitty, and Lt. Col. Eric Welsh, battalion commander for 2/7 Cav, at Forward Operating Base, Marez, here in Mosul. During his time here, Lt. General Odierno met at length with commanders here and was briefed on operations here in Nineveh province, in northern Iraq.
As part of the Lt. General's visit here in Mosul, he was taken to Iraqi Police headquarters in a section of Mosul and had an extensive briefing from Col. Abid, an Iraqi Police commander here in Mosul. During the hour-plus long meeting with Col. Abid, Oderno heard many details on the situation here in Nineveh province. Odierno asked Col. Abid, "what is the threat of Al Queda in the Mosul area?"
Col. Abid, who is a former Iraqi Army officer with 18-years experience under Saddam Hussein's rule, replied, "The Al Queda threat here is not as big a problem as is the insurgency comprised of former Iraqi Army officers who were discarded by Paul Bremmer early on in the war after the fall of Baghdad". Lt. General Oderno, Col. Twitty as well as Lt. Col. Welsh all nodded in agreement.
Lt. General Odierno then said to Col. Abid, "We have found that Al Queda forces have been pushed out of areas such as Anbar province in the west, Baghdad, Baquaba, as well as other places and are trying to regroup, unsuccessfully here in Mosul."
As the meeting continued, many points were discussed including the cooperation between 2/7 Cav and the Iraqi Police here in Mosul and surrounding areas that
make up Nineveh province. Through translators, a steady flow of communication about other issues, including concerns by the Iraqi Police Colonel in regards to America's future course in Iraq were discussed at length. Col. Abid explained that prior
to Lt. General Odierno's visit today, he (Abid) had been watching on television the report that General Petraeus was giving to Congress.
Col. Abid pleaded to Odierno and the others present, (including myself), that, "If America leaves now, or at any time in the very near near future, there will be massive killings all throughout Nineveh province, including especially here in Mosul".
To this statement, Lt. General Odierno replied emphatically to Col. Abid, "Don't worry Colonel, we're not going anywhere".
Colonel Abid went on to explain that in the last two years, many great strides had been accomplished in conjunction with the previous units before 2/7 Cav here in Mosul, but even greater strides were made in the last 11 months under the direction of Lt. Col.
Eric Welsh who spearheads personally day to day combat operations in and around the Mosul area.
Other issues that were brought up during the meeting included formulating a plan to recall the once discarded former Iraqi Army officers, Bathists, who Paul Bremmer of the CPA, (Coalition Provisional Authority) had insisted were to have no part in the new Iraqi Army. All the parties in the room agreed that current plans are indeed to find a way to bring those previously not allowed into the new Iraqi Army, now into positions in both the Iraqi Police as well as the Iraqi Army.
Col. Abid explained to those in attendance, "Those former Army officers previously excluded now make up much more of a threat than the Al Queda forces operating and being eliminated in Iraq now". He also went on to detail that in the last couple years, he has lost over 1200 Iraqi police killed in action yet still their motivation for continuing along side the US and coalition forces is more determined than ever.
Later Col. Abid went on to show on a computer the recent cache sweeps that netted many weapons and materials for use against the US and coalition forces as well as Iraqi civilians. Before the meeting closed, other issues were brought up concerning the matter of Iraqi Police death benefits that were supposed to be paid by the Iraqi Government, have yet to be forthcoming.
Col. Abid said to Lt. General Odierno, "There are many terrorists operating today inside the current Iraqi government". Those in the room listened intently as Col. Abid diligently made his point. "We must find a way to bring in the once excluded former Army officers into our forces to help eliminate this problem".
Col. Abid mentioned directly to Lt. General Odierno that his only complaint is that each time a change of unit occurs, such as the inevitable upcoming redeployment of 2/7 Cav back to Ft. Bliss, TX, he (Abid) is worried that subversive forces will try to undermine his position by telling lies to the new units when they take over. At this, Col. Twitty spoke up directly and said to Abid, "And you know Col. whenever anything like that has been attempted here in the past towards you from the Iraqis you speak of, we
always supported you and let it be known our trust and confidence in your leadership. We are sure the next units will be well briefed concerning your position and cooperate fully with the progress that has already been accomplished with 2/7 Cav."
At this, Col. Abid smiled, and said, "but I will miss Lt. Col. Welsh and his men."
Lt. General Odierno replied, "And these men will have been away from their families for nearly 15-months by the time they arrive home. They do not have the luxury to go home everyday to their families as you do".
One final question was asked by Lt. General Odierno to Abid and that was, "What is your biggest threat or fear?".
To this, Col. Abid took a deep breath and solemnly replied, "Our families. The insurgents always threaten our families and are able to carry out on those threats at times. This is my number one concern".
As the meeting closed, Lt. General Odierno, Col. Twitty and Lt. Col. Welsh assured the Iraqi Police Colonel that the units that replace them will continue to work towards finding and implementing progress here in Nineveh province.
Mosul has had a higher degree of success in dealing with insurgent activities, Al Queda forces as well as a competent Iraqi Police force and Iraqi Army forces that have displayed a joint working relationship with US and coalition partners than other parts throughout Iraq. Many speculate that Mosul and all of Nineveh province may be the prototype for what the new Iraq might look like in the months and years ahead in regards to progress and cooperation of all parties concerned.
After the meeting finished, Lt. General Odierno was taken back to Forward Operating Base Marez where he met with Army mechanics working on improving and armoring Iraqi Police trucks.
Comments (7)
Jim,
Looks like you're in the catbird's seat again! Today's (9/14/2007) New York Times has an op-ed video on Paul Bremmer's involvement in the current sectarian violence in IRAQ. See the story "Op-Ed: How I Didn’t Dismantle Iraq’s Army" @ http://video.on.nytimes.com/
Watching that video made me want to take that fool to the woodshed!
Posted by Annamaria | September 15, 2007 12:48 AM
Posted on September 15, 2007 00:48
Dear Jim,
Again - another good article. It's amazing how you always manage to go where others cannot. Your stories always give me another perspective on the war.
Peggy
Posted by Peggy Gray | September 15, 2007 2:20 AM
Posted on September 15, 2007 02:20
Jim, I'll be looking forward seeing u again when u pass thru my AO!!... Great Pictures!!!
Posted by Paul Willigenburg | September 15, 2007 6:31 AM
Posted on September 15, 2007 06:31
Jim,
I keep rereading your account of the meeting between Lt. General Odierno, Col. Steven Twitty, and Lt. Col. Eric Welsh, and Col. Abid, the Iraqi Police commander, and comparing the facts laid out in that discussion with the NYT account of Paul Bremmer who, *nine days* into a civilian job at the Pentagon, gave the order to disband the Iraqi army.
I find myself dazed by the gross arrogance of those facts, in light of the terrible consequences of that decision. His stupidity has contributed to subsequent thousands of deaths of US and Allied soldiers, civilians, and IRAQI citizens.
How does one man get that much power 9 days into a civilian job?
When I toured the Pentagon, we had one poor guide who had to jog backwards with us everywhere we went, just to keep visual tabs on all of us. What happened to Bremmer's Pentagon handlers? It takes the term "loose cannon" to a whole new low.
This has definitely given me a reason to besiege heaven! It's going to take entire legions of heavenly soldiers to pull all of us (and I do mean *all* of us!) out of this mess! Soldiers, civilians, IRAQIs, we've all been put under a crushing burden by this mistake.
Sorry for going on and on...After Viet Nam, a veteran diplomat came forward with his own assessment of our failure there due, according to his insight, to our failure to close off access from Cambodia. Maybe every war has its own critical mistakes, but this one is a doozie.
It would be helpful if we could keep rank amateurs from making military policy decisions--at least until they have the background and expertise to know what they're talking about.
Posted by Annamaria | September 16, 2007 12:18 AM
Posted on September 16, 2007 00:18
Annamaria;
Just to give you a little more sympathy for Brenner's decision, I strongly suggest you read the classic essay by de Atkine, "Why Arab Armies Lose Wars". SH's army was a classic Arab army. Officers were selected and "parachuted" in from family and clan connections. Soldiers and NCOs were actually prevented from becoming competent at their jobs. No officer would make a decision when he could pass the buck to a higher level. The only enemy the army was capable of fighting were civilians, and that was their basic raison d'etre.
Posted by Brian H | September 16, 2007 3:29 AM
Posted on September 16, 2007 03:29
Sorry, forgot the link: " Why Arab Armies Lose Wars".
Posted by Brian H | September 16, 2007 3:33 AM
Posted on September 16, 2007 03:33
Brian H,
Thanks for the historical reference. I was aware of the structural and personnel weaknesses of the IRAQI army under Saddam. But that didn't keep US policy makers from making promises to their leadership. They had a reasonable expectation of assimilation and integration.
Bremer's preemptive decision threw a workable if pragmatic military and intelligence strategy into chaos, and a million IRAQI soldiers' families into serious economic and emotional distress.
That pressure was bound to fuel insurgencies. The most shocking piece of this decision is Paul Bremer's background--he was a career diplomat.
See the Wikipedia profile @ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L._Paul_Bremer
Bremer's decision destroyed any chance we had of "turning" that army toward cooperation, and transformed the majority into outlaws.
The fact that the US military authorities he claimed to have talked to and consulted with deny any contact or discussion with him prior to his announcing the decision gives substantial credibility to the widespread criticism of his decision. His was a monumental screwup, and blaming the IRAQI army for his stupidity is obfuscation.
Posted by Annamaria | September 16, 2007 2:47 PM
Posted on September 16, 2007 14:47